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## THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN QUESTION AND THE VIEWS OF FRANCE.

By M. FORCADE, EDITOR OF THE "REVUE DES DRUG  
MONDÉS."

(Translated for the Herald from the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of January, 1854.)

We have to reproach ourselves for having for a long time and often fatigued our readers with this affair of Schleswig-Holstein. More than once we have encountered satirical wonderment at the erudition which seemed to possess on the subject of this political complication as we have unfolded all its slow and varying evolutions. Now, however, this chronic mischief has arrived at its sharpest crisis, and we shall be less condemned for being long occupied by it. The misfortune of the Danish-German question is that it is very difficult to comprehend; it is difficult to comprehend because it is greatly complicated. There are united almost all orders of questions which elsewhere and on a vast theatre more and more impress the people.

The duchies of Schleswig and Holstein have for long ages been placed under the government of the Sovereigns who reign in Denmark. Contiguous to Denmark, governed by the same dynasty, we have been accustomed to regard them as forming a part of the Danish monarchy—as one of the elements of this monarchy which, in a maritime point of view, always has held a place so useful and honourable in the equilibrium of Europe. This long continued oneness was established more easily in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, than at the commencement of the 19th century, when the States were very nearly all throughout Europe monarchical, and the union of provinces was only expressed in the identity of the sovereign. During this long epoch they were either ignored, or accounted for little, the notions of *nationality*, and the distinctions, grievances, conflicts, and passionate explosions to which the sentiment of nationality has given place in our days. But of late years the difficulty of Schleswig-Holstein has issued at the same time from the modern question of constitutional reforms, and the question, more modern still, of nationalities, and from the question which has issued from the old law—the law of the ancient *ius cogens* respecting the right of succession.

The Danes have in our days felt and shown themselves worthy to possess a constitutional and liberal Government, and they found in the sovereign just deceased, a king sufficiently enlightened and sufficiently honest to second the accomplishment of the wishes of his people. Europe heard him a few weeks before his death proclaim that in his eyes the political qualities of his people were such, that rather than submit them to a foreign affront he would not hesitate to descend from his throne and constitute a republic.

The first difficulty issued from the organization of liberal institutions in Denmark. Holstein formed part of the German Confederation. There were two systems possible—to leave to Holstein its special institutions, or to comprehend it in the general institutions of the Danish monarchy. But here another complication was presented. Schleswig had not formed a part of the German Confederation; yet, nevertheless, Schleswig, *ab antiquo*, was united to Holstein by a political tie of a special nature. It submitted to the same law of succession as Holstein. The princes whose dynasty finished in the person of Frederick VII. were the dukes of Schleswig and Holstein before they became Kings of Denmark; and this dynasty in ending, might have different heirs, in Denmark, properly so called, on the one side, and in the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein on the other; the two duchies in this case reverting to the same heir. As a consequence of these origins, and of this bond, which the order of succession had created between Schleswig and Holstein, there was naturally established between the two duchies a certain community of administration and institutions. Besides one part of Schleswig, the southern, contiguous to Holstein, was occupied by a population of German languages and race. The question to be determined—whether they should leave Holstein outside the Danish constitution, or whether they should comprehend it—was no longer a simple one. Whatever was the arrangement which they made in Holstein or Schleswig, one of these duchies drew the other after it. If Denmark, regarding the distinct position which gave Holstein the place it held in the German Confederation, wished to leave it outside the constitution and Danish representative government, immediately Holstein would require that Schleswig—which is united to it, not by the German federal bond, but by the bond of a law of succession and common institutions—should not be separated from it, to be incorporated with the Danish constitution. Nevertheless, Schleswig, not making part of the German Federation, nor owing to the German Empire any obligation or federal authority, the Danish Government would not and could not demand Schleswig to a system of institutions separate from those of the monarchy. Be it so, they say to it, but then it is necessary to comprehend Schleswig with Holstein in the Danish constitution.

And this principle being laid down, the question was far from being resolved. Difficulties even more irritating resulted from its complication. It was then, in fact, necessary to know the place which Schleswig and Holstein should have in the constitution, and the rights of the votes which the representatives of the Duchy obtained in the Riksdag (Parliament). It is on these points these discussions have for many years taken place between the Court of Copenhagen and the agitators of Holstein, or rather between Denmark and the German Diet acting in the name of Holstein, and affording to the demands of this Duchy the assistance of the agitators and power of Germany. From contradiction to contradiction, from demand to demand, the German Diet by subtle reasoning arrived at the resolution to dictate to Denmark the terms of its constitution. In starting from Holstein it extended its interference into the very bosom of the Danish Government. It is necessary to have these facts of the question presented to the mind to comprehend on the one part the connection of the German pretensions, and on the other the irritations which these pretensions, pushed to excess, have excited in the bosom of the Danish people and of all the Scandinavian races.

It is seen that the principal difficulty of the affair resides in the question of succession. If, as a result of this meeting, had not been raised, there would have been no apparent change in the extinction of the Royal Family, that the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein might have been separated from Denmark and passed to the same dual heir, it is evident that the Danish-Germanic difficulty would not have assumed such grave proportions. Germany not having any rights upon Schleswig, the King of Denmark, sovereign in this duchy, would have been able to assimilate it politically to the Danish Government, and the Diet would not have had a case to go beyond the Federal execution in Holstein itself.

But it becomes necessary to reflect on the inherent difficulties of this question, since it was

certain that King Frederick VII., dying without children, would leave the question of succession open to disputes and to divisions which might lead to the dismemberment of the Danish monarchy. Such a prospect seriously inquired the great European Powers. These great Powers were bound to look before all things to the political and European side of the question. The question as to European interest was to maintain the territorial limits of the Danish monarchy. It little signified that this territorial boundary was the result of this or that law of inheritance, bringing the annexation of races speaking different tongue. That which was of importance was that this territorial state had received the consecration of ages, that it had put the important keys of the Baltic into the hands of a nation which was not strong enough to use its power in an egotistical or tyrannical manner, a nation which was not too feeble to make itself respected if necessary to its independence and neutrality, and which had permitted to Denmark to fulfil a useful part in Europe. The Great Powers, unanimously struck with these considerations of European interest, made the treaty of 1852. This treaty settled the Danish succession by a disinterested arrangement on the part of these powers, conservative in view of European interests, and liberal to Denmark. They agreed to the necessary renunciations obtained in favour of the present King. The Imperial house of Russia, which might have claimed a portion of Holstein, where the port of Copenhagen abandoned its pretensions; the German Powers, who had ordered their rights and their portions of Schleswig, and the late Duke of Augustenburg exchanged his own for a pecuniary indemnity. This treaty, the work of reason and foresight, was signed by the two great German Powers, and received the adhesion of many secondary German States. It is to be regretted that it was not presented for acceptance to the Diet, and at the same time to the various German Courts. Was it that they apprehended the resistance of the Diet, or its delays? But it might have been easily accomplished in 1852. The influence of Austria and Prussia, united in the same engagement by a signature still fresh, aided by the adhesion obtained from many secondary States, might have easily conquered certain resistances which would not then have been encouraged by a lively agitation of German opinion. Was it that the approbation of the Diet was deemed useless, or rather that it was set aside systematically under the idea then dominant amidst the cabinets to exclude it as much as possible from the deliberation of European questions? In acting in this way they have deprived themselves of a concurrence which at this day would be very precious. They have wounded the susceptibility of German self-love; they have voluntarily afforded to the Diet a pretext to make reserve on the succession of the duchies, and to augment by this reticence the effervescence of German public opinion which desires now to separate definitely Schleswig and Holstein from the Danish monarchy in claiming them as the heritage of the present Duke of Augustenburg.

The danger of the situation is in fact the upsurge of German patriotism, too long opposed by the bad organisation of the German Confederation, and the powerlessness to which this organization was condemned in the deliberation and solution of European questions. We may regret the bad direction which Germany has taken in the question of Denmark. It is serving nothing, it would not be equitable—it would be dangerous to misunderstand the just grievance of German patriotism. Germany, it is right to avow, has not in European transactions the place and influence to which it is entitled. Here is a people which amount to fifteen million souls; this people is one of the most enlightened in Europe; in science, in philosophy, and in all the developments of intellectual life, none surpass it. It displays in business a skill and an activity incontestable; it is endowed with an extraordinary force of expansion, and its population overflowing, sends colonists and pioneers of civilisation to the extremities of the earth. In the great past political struggles of the age, Germany had been a mere machine in the hands of routine Governments, but when it was awakened it exercised all of a sudden a decisive action on events. Notwithstanding all these titles to be admitted, listened to, and accounted for in the political and international deliberations of other great countries, Germany has seen itself annulled. It has seen its place occupied by the two great Powers of the Confederation—Austria and Prussia,—which are not able to represent them but incompletely, and which, having important possessions not German, have at heart other interests than those of Germany. They are, in short, nearly always in contest, dividing and neutralizing Germany by their constant rivalries, or overruling it imperiously when on rare occasions they are in accordance. Such is the false position and vice of the situation of Germany. The Germans for a long time have had neither use of the point, nor humiliating position. From this arises the profound disquiet which pervades them, from this the aspirations to organise a better administration and a more united and free action of the Confederation. From this arises the movement of the National Verein, which has so rapidly increased during late years; and the striking and recent manoeuvre of the Emperor of Austria, which rendered homage to the German aspirations even in offering them illusory satisfaction.

The first issue which opened itself for the expression of the ill-concealed disquiet and discontented ambition of German patriotism was the question of Schleswig-Holstein. In this question is engaged an evidently national interest—the interest of German self-love—interest for increasing the power of the German confederation, and which aims to assure the possession of the two banks of the roadstead of Kiel. The Germans attached themselves much more to their pretensions in this point, when to the question of federal jurisdiction came to be added the question of succession. Thanks to this incident of succession, they have in their hands a penal sanction! thanks to this incident of succession by which they may fortify themselves in their complaints against Denmark! If Denmark persists to divide the two duchies and to incorporate Schleswig in the constitution of the monarchy they threaten not to recognise the Treaty of London—to separate for ever the two duchies of the monarchy by sustaining the pretensions of the Duke of Augustenburg. By this the Germans, will avenge themselves of the offensive omission which the Powers have made of the Diet, at the moment of the conclusion of the Treaty of London; by this the secondary States will make Austria and Prussia feel that their association in a European act, is not sufficient to implicate and draw after it the adhesion of all Germany. In fine, all the German parties, for the moment at least, found their action in this claim. The secondary States which the unitary movement menaces, the first, acquire unexpected popularity

in becoming the most vigorous organs of the national sentiment, and the unitary party has reason to expect that the emotion which has taken possession of Germany will profit to the more strong and concentrated reorganisation of the Federation. Germany of the South and Germany of the North, though profoundly divided, owe to this incident the novelty of an accord which surprises and enchants them. All that is passing to-day in Germany with reference to Schleswig and Holstein has then the character of a crisis, which will have prolonged and important consequences to them.

The most serious phenomenon which presents itself in this state of things is the inefficacy which appears to menace the Treaty of London. This treaty was an honest and a disinterested act—it was the work of six Powers, of which five were the first in Europe. It seemed to be clothed with the highest moral and material authority. Nevertheless, to judge of the present conduct of the Germans, this treaty is in danger of having no force. The Germans do not seem to make any account of it, and are prepared to set it aside. From whence comes this powerlessness of European authority as expressed in the Treaty of London? It comes from the present relations of the great Powers who have signed this treaty. For diplomatic acts to have any true force, it is necessary that they should have Executive sanction. At the end of a treaty, as at the end of a congress, when there is not an alliance of Powers resolved to execute their decisions, treaties and congresses are only sterile manifestations and vain parades. Without such an alliance the treaties remain without virtue—they are only parchment scratched and spotted with great seals of wax. In the affronts to which the great Treaty of London is exposed we see the revelation of the mischief from which European order to this day suffers. There are no more alliances. The general treaties are by consequence stripped of efficacy. The treaties no longer protect the feeble, and it will not be long before it will be seen whether they can protect the strong. To make treaties or congresses anew when we cannot preserve alliances is a frivolous enterprise.

However this may be, if it is demanded that the issue to be the Danish question may now have, we shall be forced to the presence of three solutions of which the least violent is still full of difficulties and complications. At the point of view where things are come we believe that in any case Germany will not permit Schleswig and Holstein to be included hereafter in the interior economy of Danish institutions, under separate regimes. This pretension of Germany commences by supposing the abolition of the constitution of the 18th November, 1863, which, leaving Holstein in a distinct position, would incorporate Schleswig with the Danish monarchy. But the union of Schleswig and Holstein may be released by three different conditions: either the two duchies may participate in the common constitution of Denmark; or they may have a separate constitution while they remain attached by the personal bond of the Sovereign to the Crown of Denmark; or it may be the personal bond will be broken and the duchies be completely detached from Denmark, forming an independent sovereignty under the house of Augustenburg. England, it is said, advised the King of Denmark about the constitution of the 18th November, and the King of Denmark, in accepting the dismissal of the minister Hall, seemed to follow the counsel of English diplomacy. In this hypothesis the Danish Government will have no choice excepting in the first two solutions we have indicated. But of these two solutions the first—where Schleswig and Holstein would be comprehended together in the Danish constitution—seems impracticable, when we think that it has been tried for eleven years, and the trial of it has been a continued trouble to Denmark, without contenting Germany. This solution, in fact, opens up to the Germanic Confederation an incessant occasion of interference in the interior Government of Denmark. It tends to Germanise Denmark, and to absorb it in the circle of German interests. The second solution—that which would give two duchies placed under the same sceptre as Denmark—

mark a separate political existence—would be less best with daily difficulties, but it would be to Denmark a moral and political enervation, and, though respecting the letter, it would violate the spirit of the Treaty of London where the Powers have proclaimed "*That they recognise as permanent the principle of the integrity of the Danish monarchy.*" Nevertheless, the counsellors of English diplomacy have no other way open to Denmark than these two paths of expediency. If they choose the latter, which is their choice, will be limited in order that Prussia and Austria may maintain their adhesion to the letter of the Treaty of London, while already menacing Denmark with the military occupation of Schleswig. But whilst the King of Denmark is enclosed in this sad dilemma, the Federal execution is accomplished in Holstein, accompanied with circumstances which attack directly the Treaty of London, and is beginning to define against King Christian the question of the succession of the Duchies. They have allowed these cities and popular assemblies to proclaim the Duke of Augustenburg as the Duke of Schleswig and Holstein. The Duke has, at the same time, entered Kiel and has there initiated the organisation of his Government. But if this extreme solution, which through contempt of the Treaty of London prevails in the duchies—thanks to the calculating connivance of the Federal execution, or to the refusal of the Danes to submit to conditions offensive to their independence and their national honour, a great stroke will be inflicted, not only on the brave Danish people, but on the equilibrium of the North—the effect of which will not be slow to make itself felt in all the rest of Europe. In enfolding Denmark, a blow is struck at the whole Scandinavian race who national and political instinct has been so naturally awakened in these last times. If Denmark may resist the spoliation by arms Sweden can remain inactive. If Sweden offers its military assistance to Denmark, Russia will not suffer that the Government of Stockholm (Sweden) should hold in its hands the keys of the Baltic. Russia entering into the contest, we shall see if England will push farther her system of excessive circumsppection, and if France can, for a longer time, remain in sullen inactivity.

**THE INDIAN TELEGRAPH.**

(From the Bombay Gazette, February 4.)

INATTENTION to trifles will often spoil enterprises of great pith and moment; and it is much to be feared that the magnificent undertaking which now seems in so fair a way of completion, of uniting India with England by the telegraphic wire, may yet break down almost at our own doors, through the slothfulness and neglect of the Indian Government. By the middle of this year, unless the calculations of the engineers in charge of the Persian Gulf cable turn out to be quite erroneous, and unless

to the Arabs between Bagdad and Bussora who are now giving trouble save themselves more it different than savages in general (not to speak of civilized nations) to the soft influences of a civilized, uninterupted telegraphic communication will have been established between London and Kurrachee. The line for this distance will be worked regularly and well, because it will be under the control of men trained in English offices, accustomed to the telegraphs of the present day, and not to those of twenty years ago, and capable of being trusted to do what they have to do honestly and faithfully. But Kurrachee once reached, the loathed opposition obtains of all that our hearts would desire in a telegraphic office. We regret to say that the telegraph office which we speak of so long ago is not likely to begin operations for some time to come; and it is impossible for any one to contemplate without horror the dreadful possibility of being left dependant for daily telegrams from England, on the tender mercies of the telegraph clerks between Bombay and Kurrachee. Our Government seems to be even now, quite unconscious of the fact that the ships with part of the gulf cable on board have already sailed; and that in three months' time there must be an immense increase of work to be done by the line from this presidency to Kurrachee. They make no sign of strengthening the establishment, or of putting up one or two more wires along the line, but are apparently content to wait and see whether Sir Charles Bright will succeed or fail before moving hand or foot to help him. Sad experience has taught us what an Indian telegraph office can do when it has to forward telegrams from Europe only once a fortnight. But conceive the state of mind into which we should be thrown by a repetition from day to day of the blunders, the confusion, the inexplicable and vexatious delays, the wholesale and retail roguery which make the Galle telegraph a pest to the whole of India! A month of such "direct telegraphic communication with England" would drive every journalist in the empire mad; and the charitable hope of attaining this end is the only motive we can suggest for the conduct of Government in allowing things to remain as they are. To make matters worse, the Galle line, wretchedly inefficient as it is, is a well conducted and useful line compared with that to Kurrachee. The route of the latter telegraph would have been comparatively safe and practicable, if it had followed the present dark road from Deesa to Hyderabad; but the sagacious engineers who planned it carried the line 60 miles south of Hyderabad and then through the marshy land in summer and the sand and water in winter of the Runn of Cutch, where it is absolutely certain that no posts or wires yet invented can be long kept standing. The consequence, as Mr. Marshall, the Commissioner of Sindh, last pointed out in a letter to the Supreme Government, getting stabbed for his pains, that the telegraph from Bombay to Kurrachee is useless for on the average 193 days out of the 365 in each year. We have, therefore, the pleasant prospect before us of having our English telegrams detained at Kurrachee till they are worthless at least as often as they are forwarded to Bombay. This scandalous state of things could not have been permitted to exist up to this time, had it been possible to obtain redress for any telegraphic irregularities in this Presidency. But Colonel Douglas, wisely for his own comfort, and with that impartial disregard of the public interests which has marked his whole administration, has ordained that there shall be but one "complaint office" in the telegraph department

## THE SETTLEMENT IN JAPAN

(From the China Mail, January 7.)

NOTWITHSTANDING the peace recently concluded in Japan by the acceptance of Satsuma's money and "pledge" by Colonel Neal, we are not aware that many people consider our footing in Japan better than it was at the time of Mr. Richardson's murder. Our own impression is that it is, if possible, not so good. At Kagoshima, we have no doubt at all but that Satsuma or his officers intended to sink our ships; that they failed to do, and they suffered serious damage and heavy loss in consequence. I became plain to them then that if the policy of fighting was to be continued, some accession of strength on their own part was imperative. By an unlucky Customs confiscation in which a seizure of firecrackers in the form of Dahlgren guns was made in the Macao waters, it is believed by most people that Satsuma's supplies of large arms were shown to be cut off. This, to the Prince, proved the unkindest cut of all, and, soon afterwards, the form of peacemaking was gone through which we began by alluding to. His poverty (of resources) and not his will consented, the money was paid, the old stereotyped form of promising to seek out and bring to justice persons who were gone through, and, for the fifth or sixth time, the British authorities declared themselves satisfied. To complete the farce, Satsuma's envoys made themselves uncommonly civil, were very communicative and chatty, and sent gifts after the manner of other nations when peace has been concluded. They also asked whether Admiral Kuper would not sell them a man-of-war, which we have no doubt his Excellency would have done had there been any of his fleet in the market at the moment. Being now at perfect peace with the Japanese, our speculators had better send to England for that condemned steamram about which so much noise has been made. A letter from Satsuma would very soon make it out of exchequer, and the owner would probably let it go cheap. A man with command of capital might indeed make a magnificent thing out of Satsuma's exigencies. He has only to go home by the next mail and be in readiness to buy up the Lay-Obobse flotilla, paying for it if need be by drafts on China. Guns, small arms, and ammunition, will also form a first-rate article for the Japan market for years to come. There will be no necessity for taking such cargoes to Yedo. Any port on Prince Satsuma's dominions will be open to such freights, and no doubt that rising young nobleman will permit the owners to fill up with soft goods from Manchester in return for favors conferred; probably the Prince will even be willing to make his payments in silk or market rates or under, for there is no doubt, but that his Excellency can command a better market for buying than the native dealer at Kanagawa or Nagasaki. There are not mere light

words of jocularly; they will be the serious utterances of all who will take the trouble to look at the matter attentively. What weight, we would ask, is to be placed upon the civilities lately shown us either by the Tycoon or his powerful peer? Common Japanese politeness dictated all their fine statements, as politeness is allowed to dictate statements among ourselves, and very properly, which we should be surprised to find any man interpreting literally. Have we studied the Japanese character so long that the present lull is to blind us to the true state of matters? We have not only studied closely the character of that race and of its rulers—in their broadest features of course—for a number of years, but we have come to the unanimous conclusion that they are self-satisfied to a pitch of haughtiness; while, whatever may be their honour and faith among each other, they look upon us as no breach of honour to deceive foreigners; to assassinate them at midnight or when they are unarmed; to impede their trade by subtle devices; to use by any devices that are not subtle; to send them as false alarms of approaching assassinations, at uncertain intervals, in order probably that they may be off their guard when the real attack is made; and to go on slaking with their lives and their honour as it suits them best, in pursuance of a system of repression intended, most probably, to end in expulsion from the country.

Have we forgotten the exodus from Yedo of all the noble families who had resided there for centuries; the subsequent burning of the British and American Legation buildings; the retreat or retirement upon Yokohama of the different foreign ministers; the attempt to induce our withdrawal from Yokohama; the proposal to fortify a commanding point in Yokohama bay; or the thousand and one patient manœuvres to annoy and repress us, to render our stay harassing, and our trade unprofitable. Oraca we surrendered upon a tissue of statements which had a strong odour of falsehood about them. Lord Russell's *quid pro quo* concessions for that surrender, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/19999/19999-h/19999-h.htm>

Will no kind of teaching tell us to value the late "peace" at the value of a farthing rushlight? The money payments are not to be compared for a moment to an arbitrary penalty, compared with the voluntary sacrifice made years ago in the general exodus from the ed. Like an unwearied, scheming cautious chess-player, Japan sits opposite England making move for move. She has shown, all along, her knowledge of the value of working with pawns. Her principal moves have been pawn moves, and she has managed to lock up our own pawns so completely that we have been driven desperately, but as an only resource, to operate with our knights. Every chessplayer knows that such a game is as surely a losing game as if it were already lost. The slow, steady, careful pawn play can be made an almost invulnerable form of attack against all the larger pieces combined, and we find that on our bringing a rook to bear on Satsuma, we meet it with equally heavy ordnance, and was only placed in a slightly more disadvantageous position; our principal boast is that he failed to capture our piece; our chief shame, that we failed to take his castle. Britain cannot play with such an opponent, unless by means of a large land force; and those who consider our present position as either satisfactory or firm, or as by any means likely to lead on to permanent results are, we humbly submit, grievously mistaken. This hand-to-mouth policy of ours has no terrors for the Japanese nobles.

## THE NEW ZEALAND WAR.

(From the Times, January 20.)

Two documents, side by side, in our yesterday's columns, present one of those contrasts very frequent in this country, where we possess at once, and in general accord, the highest development of imperial rule and of public opinion. From the same metropolis there issue official directions for the conduct of a war between our colonists and aborigines on the other side of the world, and those utterances of mercy and of peace which undoubtedly represent the first feelings and last wishes of all our educated classes. A long list of well-known names, foremost, as the phrase is, in every good work, is appended to a memorial addressed to the Governor of New Zealand. It is the highest praise of this appeal that it will find a response in the heart of every Englishman worthy of the name. The acts which it deprecates are just those which must always be unpopular here. England does not go into war until driven into it; nor does she continue war a day longer than necessary. She never declines honest and reasonable overtures. She does not want to dispose of a single savage of his land by his field, even though she is, under the pressure of social necessity, she has so immense classes of indigenous peasants ousted of their holdings, and hereditary landlords of their estates. Our extensive colonial literature, our great geographical curiosity, our missions, our churches rising up everywhere, in the remotest wilderness, all testify to the fact that it is not the territory, but the people, whom we wish to call our own; and that the interest of the possession disappears when the aboriginal race is either extinct or is reduced to a miserable remnant. We read with delight of native chiefs, native ceremonies, native counsels, the eloquence of native orators and the wisdom of natives, of native traditions and rules of State. Such are our feelings, and they spring from the same source as that varied benevolence which at home penetrates every alley and every cottage in this country. We shall all be rejoiced to hear that peace had been obtained upon terms which saved our honour and the British sovereignty, even though it added nothing to the soil in our possession. We should deem it a heavy item in any indictment against the Colonial Governor that he had neglected a fair opportunity of peace, or stood out for terms which the natives could not be expected to accept. As to confiscation—that is a question which, by the experience of all wars and treaties, cannot be dismissed in a breath. The expenses of the war must be paid; outrage and fraud must be redressed; military positions must be held for security; but, no doubt, we should all of us be very glad to hear that order had been restored without any violent interference with the former state of property and occupation. Why, then, might not everybody have added his signature to this Memorial? Perhaps the Colonial Secretary's despatch to the Governor of New Zealand is a sufficient answer to this question. The Memorial, if not wholly unnecessary, was not required to temper the severity of our colonial rule. The Despatch which the Duke of Newcastle had sent to Sir George Grey as long ago as August 25th, shows how the British Government could be just and generous, and could withdraw what appeared to be a doubtful step even under the greatest provocation.

It appears that the Government of New Zealand about four years ago did what many a

men has done to his cost in this country. It purchased some land from the dishonest *Chief*, who failed to inform it either as to the claims, or the land or his own complicity in these claims, or the actual occupation of parts of the land, or his own intended reserve. It is difficult to conceive how any Government could be so egregiously duped, and we must either suppose there is some unexplained mystery, or the Teira—like many savages, and many apparently stupid men among us—was, under the guise of simplicity, a consummate rogue. However this may be, the purchased land had been occupied by our troops, and the supposed intruders dispossessed. Sir George Grey, even after a disaster and under circumstances too likely to lower the native opinion of our firmness and courage, had agreed to throw up this untoward purchase, and wipe his hands of the quarrels thence arising. But neither this nor any other possible concession could touch the main difficulty. *W. King*, the person who some years ago saw in these quarrels the prospect of founding a native sovereignty, and has had some success, has laid down as limiting the power of the natives to dispose of their own lands, with the avowed object of confining the British colonists to the immediate neighbourhood of the ports. This man is simply a usurper: his laws are simply usurpations; and both he and they have no other sanction than the support which he may happen to receive. The best that can be said for him is that, having a fair field of enterprise, he has seized it, and has made tolerable use of it; but by all the laws that ever stood against man and man, he is an upstart rebel against our existing authority and rule, and his power, such as it is, he promises to use with no unsparring hand. It is against his rebellion that we are now in arms. The acts of violence attributed to our colonists, as is explained in the Despatch, were not interference with property or the assertions of a title under dispute, but military operations required for the progress of our army and the suppression of rebellion. Such acts cannot be withdrawn, and, indeed, must be repeated as occasion requires: unless, indeed, our colonists were to allow the natives to occupy the whole country within the range of military occupation, and play, just as suits their convenience, the part of peaceful husbandmen or of murderous foes.

The consideration that most immediately affects us is that there we are, and we must make the best of it. It is too late to ask how we came to find ourselves in New Zealand, or whether England had the right to claim a sovereignty which, as a whole, no Power had ever claimed before. As things are, for us to give way, and to allow the insurgent wave of half-educated and more than half-corrupted savagery to overflow all the territory we have reclaimed, and break against our very towns, would be the greatest conceivable misfortune to these poor creatures. W. King would speedily find other chiefs with pretensions at once more novel and more attractive than his own, and might finish his career, as many New Zealand chiefs before, by supplying a meal to his successful rival. So we are consulting the interests of the natives, as well as the necessities of our own position, by making to peace with either him or any other chief so long as they attempt to lay down laws aimed against the British sovereignty. The struggle cannot last long, for the causes of dissolution which that age has been at work in this island will be irremediable. We cannot even see the appearance of Europeans in that part of the world. It is not we alone who have done the mischief; we found it at work; and New Zealand may still have to thank us for postponing the fatal hour when the Maori will be as extinct as the huge wingless birds and the strange marsupial animals that once occupied that last discovered region of the world. What we have now to do is plain enough; we have to suppress a rebellion; and the memorialists themselves will hardly quarrel with the way in which the Duke of Newcastle proposes to do so, and to pave the way for a solid peace.

## GERMANY AND DENMARK

(From the Times' Berlin Correspondent.)

Berlin, January 19.  
 The history of the despatch of the *ultimatum* to Denmark seems to be as follows:—In the Cabinet Council held on the night of the 13th instant it was decided—somewhat suddenly, as it seems, for the Danish Chargé d’Affaires was sent for at a ball given that night at the British Embassy, in order that he might sign the necessary passport for the *Feld-Jäger*, or courier, who was to take it, and who started the next morning. Of course this was previous to the decision of the Diet with respect to the motion of Austria and Prussia, but there could be no reasonable doubt as to what that decision would be, and, in case of anything extraordinary intervening of a nature to alter the determination of the two Powers, the telegraph was there to stop the delivery of the *ultimatum*. This, on the contrary, it was doubtless decided to maintain in the Council held here on the afternoon of Friday, the 15th. As regards the report yesterday mentioned, that Austria and Prussia require, in addition to the withdrawal of the Constitution, that Denmark should fix the bases of subsequent concessions, no confirmation of it has reached me; but, in fact, the question is unimportant, since King Christian could not possibly withdraw the Constitution without the sanction of the Diet, and there was no time to obtain that within the delay allowed.

The question now is, what will next take place? The Augustenburg party seems discouraged to-day. Whatever may happen in Denmark, they see the realisation of their own desires postponed. The idea appears prevalent among them that, since the occupation of Schleswig is to be undertaken in the interest of Denmark,—that is to say, to prevent a Federal occupation calculated to give the Duchies into the hands of Prince Frederick,—the Danes will only simulate assistance before vacating the ground. From other quarters we hear that the Copenhagen Government means no fighting, and is not at all disposed to acquiesce in the occupation by Prussia and Austria of its non-Federal province of Schleswig, for the restitution of which, in due season, it sees no possibility of obtaining a sufficient guarantee from those Powers. Various hypotheses are current. Will the Prussians pause at the Eider; will the Danes interfere before them to the Dannewik, and the interested Governments, contenting themselves with the material guarantee of a part of Schleswig thus obtained, then open negotiations? It seems very difficult that, in presence of a downright refusal of the *admirable*, the Powers sending it should content themselves with halting their troops at the Eider. Meanwhile, what are the German States doing? Nothing, so far as we to-day learn in Berlin. It is reported that their chief mover, M. von Beust, recommends that they should wait before doing anything. There is a tendency to believe that a word has been said either in Paris or here, of a nature to tranquillise the mind of the Prussian Government with respect to any possible present















TIME TABLE FOR MARCH.  
DOWN TRAINS.

STATION.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.
SYDNEY	7.00	7.15	7.30	7.45	8.00	8.15	8.30	8.45	9.00	9.15	9.30	9.45
GLADES	7.10	7.25	7.40	7.55	8.10	8.25	8.40	8.55	9.10	9.25	9.40	9.55
GLADES	7.20	7.35	7.50	8.05	8.20	8.35	8.50	9.05	9.20	9.35	9.50	10.05
GLADES	7.30	7.45	8.00	8.15	8.30	8.45	9.00	9.15	9.30	9.45	10.00	10.15
GLADES	7.40	7.55	8.10	8.25	8.40	8.55	9.10	9.25	9.40	9.55	10.10	10.25
GLADES	7.50	8.05	8.20	8.35	8.50	9.05	9.20	9.35	9.50	10.05	10.20	10.35
GLADES	8.00	8.15	8.30	8.45	9.00	9.15	9.30	9.45	10.00	10.15	10.30	10.45
GLADES	8.10	8.25	8.40	8.55	9.10	9.25	9.40	9.55	10.10	10.25	10.40	10.55
GLADES	8.20	8.35	8.50	9.05	9.20	9.35	9.50	10.05	10.20	10.35	10.50	11.05
GLADES	8.30	8.45	9.00	9.15	9.30	9.45	10.00	10.15	10.30	10.45	11.00	11.15
GLADES	8.40	8.55	9.10	9.25	9.40	9.55	10.10	10.25	10.40	10.55	11.10	11.25
GLADES	8.50	9.05	9.20	9.35	9.50	10.05	10.20	10.35	10.50	11.05	11.20	11.35
GLADES	9.00	9.15	9.30	9.45	10.00	10.15	10.30	10.45	11.00	11.15	11.30	11.45
GLADES	9.10	9.25	9.40	9.55	10.10	10.25	10.40	10.55	11.10	11.25	11.40	11.55
GLADES	9.20	9.35	9.50	10.05	10.20	10.35	10.50	11.05	11.20	11.35	11.50	12.05
GLADES	9.30	9.45	10.00	10.15	10.30	10.45	11.00	11.15	11.30	11.45	12.00	12.15
GLADES	9.40	9.55	10.10	10.25	10.40	10.55	11.10	11.25	11.40	11.55	12.10	12.25
GLADES	9.50	10.05	10.20	10.35	10.50	11.05	11.20	11.35	11.50	12.05	12.20	12.35
GLADES	10.00	10.15	10.30	10.45	11.00	11.15	11.30	11.45	12.00	12.15	12.30	12.45
GLADES	10.10	10.25	10.40	10.55	11.10	11.25	11.40	11.55	12.10	12.25	12.40	12.55
GLADES	10.20	10.35	10.50	11.05	11.20	11.35	11.50	12.05	12.20	12.35	12.50	13.05
GLADES	10.30	10.45	11.00	11.15	11.30	11.45	12.00	12.15	12.30	12.45	13.00	13.15
GLADES	10.40	10.55	11.10	11.25	11.40	11.55	12.10	12.25	12.40	12.55	13.10	13.25
GLADES	10.50	11.05	11.20	11.35	11.50	12.05	12.20	12.35	12.50	13.05	13.20	13.35
GLADES	11.00	11.15	11.30	11.45	12.00	12.15	12.30	12.45	13.00	13.15	13.30	13.45
GLADES	11.10	11.25	11.40	11.55	12.10	12.25	12.40	12.55	13.10	13.25	13.40	13.55
GLADES	11.20	11.35	11.50	12.05	12.20	12.35	12.50	13.05	13.20	13.35	13.50	14.05
GLADES	11.30	11.45	12.00	12.15	12.30	12.45	13.00	13.15	13.30	13.45	14.00	14.15
GLADES	11.40	11.55	12.10	12.25	12.40	12.55	13.10	13.25	13.40	13.55	14.10	14.25
GLADES	11.50	12.05	12.20	12.35	12.50	13.05	13.20	13.35	13.50	14.05	14.20	14.35
GLADES	12.00	12.15	12.30	12.45	13.00	13.15	13.30	13.45	14.00	14.15	14.30	14.45
GLADES	12.10	12.25	12.40	12.55	13.10	13.25	13.40	13.55	14.10	14.25	14.40	14.55
GLADES	12.20	12.35	12.50	13.05	13.20	13.35	13.50	14.05	14.20	14.35	14.50	15.05
GLADES	12.30	12.45	13.00	13.15	13.30	13.45	14.00	14.15	14.30	14.45	15.00	15.15
GLADES	12.40	12.55	13.10	13.25	13.40	13.55	14.10	14.25	14.40	14.55	15.10	15.25
GLADES	12.50	13.05	13.20	13.35	13.50	14.05	14.20	14.35	14.50	15.05	15.20	15.35
GLADES	13.00	13.15	13.30	13.45	14.00	14.15	14.30	14.45	15.00	15.15	15.30	15.45
GLADES	13.10	13.25	13.40	13.55	14.10	14.25	14.40	14.55	15.10	15.25	15.40	15.55
GLADES	13.20	13.35	13.50	14.05	14.20	14.35	14.50	15.05	15.20	15.35	15.50	16.05
GLADES	13.30	13.45	14.00	14.15	14.30	14.45	15.00	15.15	15.30	15.45	16.00	16.15
GLADES	13.40	13.55	14.10	14.25	14.40	14.55	15.10	15.25	15.40	15.55	16.10	16.25
GLADES	13.50	14.05	14.20	14.35	14.50	15.05	15.20	15.35	15.50	16.05	16.20	16.35
GLADES	14.00	14.15	14.30	14.45	15.00	15.15	15.30	15.45	16.00	16.15	16.30	16.45
GLADES	14.10	14.25	14.40	14.55	15.10	15.25	15.40	15.55	16.10	16.25	16.40	16.55
GLADES	14.20	14.35	14.50	15.05	15.20	15.35	15.50	16.05	16.20	16.35	16.50	17.05
GLADES	14.30	14.45	15.00	15.15	15.30	15.45	16.00	16.15	16.30	16.45	17.00	17.15
GLADES	14.40	14.55	15.10	15.25	15.40	15.55	16.10	16.25	16.40	16.55	17.10	17.25
GLADES	14.50	15.05	15.20	15.35	15.50	16.05	16.20	16.35	16.50	17.05	17.20	17.35
GLADES	15.00	15.15	15.30	15.45	16.00	16.15	16.30	16.45	17.00	17.15	17.30	17.45
GLADES	15.10	15.25	15.40	15.55	16.10	16.25	16.40	16.55	17.10	17.25	17.40	17.55
GLADES	15.20	15.35	15.50	16.05	16.20	16.35	16.50	17.05	17.20	17.35	17.50	18.05
GLADES	15.30	15.45	16.00	16.15	16.30	16.45	16.60	16.75	16.90	17.05	17.20	17.35
GLADES	15.40	15.55	16.10	16.25	16.40	16.55	17.10	17.25	17.40	17.55	18.10	18.25
GLADES	15.50	16.05	16.20	16.35	16.50	17.05	17.20	17.35	17.50	18.05	18.20	18.35
GLADES	16.00	16.15	16.30	16.45	16.60	16.75	16.90	17.05	17.20	17.35	17.50	18.05
GLADES	16.10	16.25	16.40	16.55	17.10	17.25	17.40	17.55	18.10	18.25	18.40	18.55
GLADES	16.20	16.35	16.50	17.05	17.20	17.35	17.50	18.05	18.20	18.35	18.50	19.05
GLADES	16.30	16.45	16.60	16.75	16.90	17.05	17.20	17.35	17.50	18.05	18.20	18.35
GLADES	16.40	16.55	17.10	17.25	17.40	17.55	18.10	18.25	18.40	18.55	19.10	19.25
GLADES	16.50	17.05	17.20	17.35	17.50	18.05	18.20	18.35	18.50	19.05	19.20	19.35
GLADES	17.00	17.15	17.30	17.45	17.60	17.75	17.90	18.05	18.20	18.35	18.50	19.05
GLADES	17.10	17.25	17.40	17.55	18.10	18.25	18.40	18.55	19.10	19.25	19.40	19.55
GLADES	17.20	17.35	17.50	18.05	18.20	18.35	18.50	19.05	19.20	19.35	19.50	20.05
GLADES	17.30	17.45	17.60	17.75	17.90	18.05	18.20	18.35	18.50	19.05	19.20	19.35
GLADES	17.40	17.55	18.10	18.25	18.40	18.55	19.10	19.25	19.40	19.55	20.10	20.25
GLADES	17.50	18.05	18.20	18.35	18.50	18.65	18.80	18.95	19.10	19.25	19.40	19.55
GLADES	18.00	18.15	18.30	18.45	18.60	18.75	18.90	19.05	19.20	19.35	19.50	20.05
GLADES	18.10	18.25	18.40	18.55	19.10	19.25	19.40	19.55	20.10	20.25	20.40	20.55
GLADES	18.20	18.35	18.50	19.05	19.20	19.35	19.50	20.05	20.20	20.35	20.50	21.05
GLADES	18.30	18.45	18.60	18.75	18.90	19.05	19.20	19.35	19.50	20.05	20.20	20.35
GLADES	18.40	18.55	19.10	19.25	19.40	19.55	20.10	20.25	20.40	20.55	21.10	21.25
GLADES	18.50	19.05	19.20	19.35	19.50	20.05	20.20	20.35	20.50	21.05	21.20	21.35
GLADES	19.00	19.15	19.30	19.45	19.60	19.75	19.90	20.05	20.20	20.35	20.50	21.05
GLADES	19.10	19.25	19.40	19.55	20.10	20.25	20.40	20.55	21.10	21.25	21.40	21.55
GLADES	19.20	19.35	19.50	20.05	20.20	20.35	20.50	21.05	21.20	21.35	21.50	22.05
GLADES	19.30	19.45	19.60	19.75	19.90	20.05	20.20	20.35	20.50	21.05	21.20	21.35
GLADES	19.40	19.55	20.10	20.25	20.40	20.55	21.10	21.25	21.40	21.55	22.10	22.25
GLADES	19.50	20.05	20.20	20.35	20.50	20.65	20.80	20.95	21.10	21.25	21.40	21.55
GLADES	20.00	20.15	20.30	20.45	20.60	20.75	20.90	21.05	21.20	21.35	21.50	22.05
GLADES	20.10	20.25	20.40	20.55	21.10	21.25	21.40	21.55	22.10	22.25	22.40	22.55
GLADES	20.20	20.35	20.50	21.05	21.20	21.35	21.50	21.65	21.80	21.95	22.10	22.25
GLADES	20.30	20.45	20.60	20.75	20.90	21.05	21.20	21.35	21.50	21.65	21.80	21.95
GLADES	20.40	20.55	21.10	21.25	21.40	21.55	21.70	21.85	22.00	22.15	22.30	22.45
GLADES	20.50	21.05	21.20	21.35	21.50	21.65	21.80	21.95	22.10	22.25	22.40	22.55
GLADES	21.00	21.15	21.30	21.45	21.60	21.75	21.90	22.05	22.20	22.35	22.50	23.05
GLADES	21.10	21.25	21.40	21.55	22.10	22.25	22.40	22.55	23.10	23.25	23.40	23.55
GLADES	21.20	21.35	21.50	22.05	22.20	22.35	22.50	23.05	23.20	23.35	23.50	24.05
GLADES	21.30	21.45	21.60	21.75	21.90	22.05	22.20	22.35	22.50	23.05	23.20	23.35
GLADES	21.40	21.55	22.10	22.25	22.40	22.55	23.10	23.25	23.40	23.55	24.10	24.25
GLADES	21.50	22.05	22.20	22.35	22.50	23.05	23.20	23.35	23.50	24.05	24.20	24.35
GLADES	22.00	22.15	22.30	22.45	22.60	22.75	22.90	23.05	23.20	23.35	23.50	24.05
GLADES	22.10	22.25	22.40	22.55	23.10	23.25	23.40	23.55	24.10			



moloney, Church-street, Parramatta, where a plan of the property can be seen.



